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Abstract: This paper reports research on improving decisions about hospital discharges ‒ 
decisions that are now made by physicians based on mainly subjective evaluations of patients’ 
discharge status. We report an experiment on efficacy of our clinical decision support software 
(CDSS) which presents physicians with evidence-based discharge criteria that can be effectively 
applied at the point of care where the discharge decision is made. We report results from an 
experimental treatment that mandates physician attentiveness to the CDSS by replacing the 
default option of universal “opt in” to patient discharge with the alternative default option of “opt 
out” from the CDSS recommendations to discharge or not to discharge the patient on each day of 
hospital stay. We also report results from experimental treatments that implement the CDSS 
under varying conditions of time pressure on the subjects. The experiments were conducted 
using resident physicians and fourth-year medical students at a university medical school as 
subjects. 
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Higher Quality and Lower Cost from Improving Hospital Discharge Decision Making 
 
1. Introduction  
In 2010 Americans spent 17.6 percent of GDP on healthcare, which was eight percentage points 
above the OECD average (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012).1 
The objective of decreasing medical costs, or at least reducing their outsized rate of increase, 
would seem to be well served by reducing hospital length of stay (LOS).  If average LOS were to 
be reduced by 10 percent, the savings could approach $100 billion per year.2 The research 
question we take up is how to assist physicians in making discharge decisions that decrease LOS 
and also lower the likelihood of unplanned readmissions, an indicator of low quality and a cost 
inflator. Physicians have rapidly increasing access to large amounts of raw data on each patient 
they treat through electronic medical record systems. The problem for improving discharge 
decision making is not shortage of data on the patient but, rather, absence of evidence-based 
discharge criteria that can be effectively applied at the point of care where the discharge decision 
is made.  
Our central activity is a collaboration between physicians who make discharge decisions 
and (experimental and behavioral) economists – with expertise in research on decisions under 
risk and mechanism design – aimed at improving hospital discharge decision making. The 
objectives are to design, experimentally test, and disseminate a clinical decision support system 
(CDSS) that can be used to lower costs – by reducing average length of hospital stay – while 
increasing quality of medical care by decreasing the likelihood of unplanned readmissions.  
An outline of current practice in hospital discharge decision making sheds light on the 
nature of the problem and a possible solution. Prior to deciding whether to discharge a patient, a 
physician examines the patient and reviews his or her electronic medical records. Criteria applied 
to making a discharge decision are derived from the physician’s recall of his or her medical 
education and own previous practice and, perhaps, recommendations of one or more colleagues. 
The evidence base of these typical discharge criteria is extremely limited in comparison to the 
                                                          
 
1  Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP (Children’s Health Insurance Program) spending alone made up 21 
percent of the 2012 federal budget (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2013). In addition, both 
Medicaid and CHIP also require matching expenditures by the states. 
2 In 2010, 39 million patients spent on average 4.7 days in hospitals at a total cost in excess of $1.28 
trillion (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012). 
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voluminous information that could be derived from the electronic medical records of the patient 
population of a hospital. A typical hospital will serve many thousands of patients per year. Each 
surviving patient will be discharged from the hospital and it will subsequently be revealed, in 
most cases, whether the discharge was successful or unsuccessful (i.e., led to unplanned 
readmission within 30 days).  The central question addressed in our research is how to use this 
mass of data – from current and former patients’ electronic medical records and outcomes from 
previous discharges of patients – in developing evidence-based discharge criteria that can be 
effectively applied at the point of care where the discharge decision is made.    
Our collaborative research began by analyzing a large sample of (de-identified) patient 
data to identify risk factors for unplanned hospital readmissions at a large southeastern teaching 
hospital (Kassin, et al. 2012). We subsequently elicited the hospital discharge criteria reported by 
physicians (Leeds, et al. 2013) and compared these self-reported criteria to (a) discharge criteria 
that can statistically explain actual discharges and (b) patient clinical and demographic data that 
predict successful or unsuccessful discharges (Leeds, et al. 2014). Although many self-reported 
criteria coincide with (statistically-explanatory) actual criteria, and many significant predictors of 
actual discharges coincide with significant predictors of successful discharges, various 
inconsistencies were identified which suggested the importance of research on creating and 
experimentally testing CDSS for improving discharge decision making. The present paper 
reports experimental testing of the authors’ CDSS. 
The research method for creating the CDSS proceeds as follows. We begin with the 
following question: Do the data profiles for patients who are successfully discharged differ in 
identifiable ways from the data profiles for patients who are unsuccessfully discharged? If the 
answer to this question is “yes” then that would open the possibility of building a decision 
support model that can inform discharge decisions for individual patients with the accumulated 
experience from discharging thousands of other patients. That is at the heart of our research 
agenda. We extract a large sample of de-identified data from the “data warehouse” of patient 
electronic medical records of a large southeastern teaching hospital. The data are used to build an 
econometric model, which provides the foundation for a decision support model that can be 
instantiated in software (i.e., the CDSS) and applied at the point of care. The CDSS presents the 
physician with a recommended discharge decision and with estimated daily readmission 
probabilities (and 80% confidence intervals); in addition, it provides information on 
dynamically-selected key clinical variables for the individual patient in a user friendly format. 
3 
 
Testing the CDSS for efficacy in improving discharge decision making includes both 
laboratory experiments and a planned field experiment, in the form of a hospital patient ward 
intervention. Ethical and practical considerations call for laboratory evaluation of the efficacy of 
the CDSS before its use in clinical intervention.  
Cox, et al. (2014) reports details of development of the CDSS and results from a 
preliminary laboratory experiment with efficacy. The present paper reports results from a new 
experimental treatment that mandates physician attentiveness to the CDSS by replacing the 
default option of universal “opt in” to patient discharge with the alternative default option of “opt 
out” from the CDSS recommendations to discharge or not to discharge the patient on each day of 
hospital stay. We also here report results from new experimental treatments that implement the 
CDSS under varying conditions of time pressure on the subjects. The experiments were 
conducted using resident physicians and fourth-year medical students at a university medical 
school as subjects.   
The organization of the paper is as follows. The following section discusses related 
literature, section 3 describes the CDSS, and sections 4 and 5 report on the experimental design 
and results from experimental tests of efficacy of the CDSS. A summary of the main findings 
and conclusions in section 6 completes the paper.   
 
2. Related Economic and Medical Journal Literature 
Hospital readmissions have recently become one of the critical healthcare quality metrics for 
American hospitals. In 2010, 19.2 percent of Medicare patients were readmitted within 30 days 
of discharge, resulting in additional hospital charges totaling $17.5 billion (Office of Information 
Products and Data Analytics, 2012). Hospitals and physicians are encountering increasing 
pressure to reduce hospital readmission rates, both from reputation effects of public disclosure of 
performance and from pay-for-performance reimbursement schemes that refuse payment for 
related readmissions.3 
                                                          
 
3 Beginning in October 2012, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began publishing 
hospitals’ readmission rates and penalizing those with “excess over expected” readmission rates for heart 
attack, heart failure and pneumonia patients. In 2012, a total of 2,217 hospitals were penalized; 307 of 
them were assessed the maximum penalty of 1 percent of their total regular Medicare reimbursements 
(Kaiser Health News, Oct 2, 2012). The scheduled penalties escalate in future years and apply to broader 
classes of treatment diagnosis codes.  
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The use of advanced information technology has been advocated as a method to increase 
healthcare quality and reduce costs (Cebul et al. 2008).  Our research is part of a larger program 
in economics that aims at the creation of information technology for medical decision making 
and its application in clinical environments intended to improve quality and lower costs of 
healthcare. A seminal contribution by economists to improving healthcare is the mechanism 
design incorporated into information technology for kidney exchange by Roth, Sönmez, and 
Ünver (2004, 2007).4 Their work provided a foundation for the New England Program for 
Kidney Exchange, and subsequent kidney exchange programs, which have led to increases in 
quality and length of life by matching patients with donors for transplant surgery while lowering 
the informational costs associated with organ matches.  Support for improving medical decision 
making is needed in many additional areas. The present paper reports one such project. Our 
research targets improving physician discharge decision making through development of CDSS.  
Thus it lies at the intersection of healthcare cost and quality issues.  
The topic of healthcare cost has been of considerable interest as the rate of growth in 
healthcare expenditures has exceeded the annual growth in real GNP per capita in the period 
since World War II (Newhouse 1992).  Newhouse identified three demand-side and two supply-
side factors that have influenced the cost of healthcare.5 The supply side factors are physician-
induced demand and low increase in productivity.  To date little research has been conducted on 
the physician-induced demand causes of the increase in healthcare costs. However, it has been 
argued that the advent of the 468 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) payment mechanism 
implemented by Medicare in 1983 would help to mitigate the incentive problems that arise when 
physicians are compensated based on the level of healthcare provided (e.g., days in the hospital) 
rather than the health problem being addressed (e.g., appendicitis); see Pauly (1986). The recent 
actions by Medicare to reduce compensation when a hospital’s rates of readmission are above 
reference levels is another effort to reduce the supplier-induced demand causes of the increase in 
healthcare costs. This action in effect lowers the effective DRG payment for treating a patient by 
reducing the amount of compensation a hospital receives if readmission rates are too high.  
                                                          
 
4 They developed a model of paired-kidney exchange for living donors and illustrated the benefits of two-
way, three-way and higher level matches. 
5 The demand side factors influencing medical costs are the increased size of our aging population, the 
spread of insurance and the increase in consumer income.   
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Our research begins with the premise that an integral component of achieving these cost 
reductions is the assimilation and dissemination of information to help physicians make better 
discharge decisions.6  Our research is one of the first efforts to develop and test the efficacy of 
using information technology to address a supplier-induced increase in healthcare costs of 
primary interest to Medicare, high rates of hospital readmission. Our research endeavors to 
contribute to development of Comparative Effectiveness Research as well as testing the efficacy 
of its utilization.7 
One of the earliest investigations of the determinants of hospital readmission in the 
medical literature was conducted by Anderson and Steinberg (1985) who found that a patient’s 
disease history and diagnosis were important determinants of a patient’s probability of 
readmission. More recent research has further illustrated the role that these patient-specific 
factors have on the probability of readmission (Demir 2014) and that the use of electronic 
medical record (EMR) data on a patient’s vital signs and laboratory test results can be used to 
explain likelihood of readmissions (Amarasingham, et al. 2010). Amarasignham, et al.’s (2010) 
reported results are relevant to our research because: (1) they validate the use of electronic 
medical records data in recovering readmission probabilities; and (2) they highlight a 
fundamental flaw with the current Medicare regulations that generate expectations for 
readmission rates with models that do not contain clinical information. The importance of using 
clinical information to inform estimates of readmission rates is also supported by Lee et al. 
(2012), who study return visits to a pediatric emergency room within 72-hours. Both 
Amarasignham, et al. (2010) and Lee, et al. (2012) conclude that their research supports the 
importance of future development of CDSS to improve discharge decision making. 
 In a recent review of 148 studies, Bright, et al. (2012), conclude that the current CDSSs 
(mostly not for discharge decisions) are effective at improving healthcare when assisting with 
physician decision making at the point of care. None of these studies, however, reports a test of 
efficacy of discharge decision support software that (a) applies at the point of care and (b) 
mandates physician attentiveness by replacing the default option of universal “opt in” to patient 
                                                          
 
6 We are not the first to highlight the importance of information in lowering health care costs. Cebul, et al. 
(2008) show that increasing information flows will lower healthcare organizational costs whereas Phelps 
(1992) argues that dissemination of the information can reduce regional variation in care.    
7 For a detailed discussion of Comparative Effectiveness Research in the economics literature see the 
discussion of Chandra, et al. (2011).  
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discharge with the alternative default option of “opt out” from the CDSS recommendations to 
discharge or not to discharge the patient on each day of hospital stay. We develop and test 
decision support software that applies at the point of care and includes a version which requires 
justification for overriding the software’s discharge recommendations.    
   
3. Features of the CDSS 
Details of development of the CDSS are reported in Cox, et al. (2014). We here summarize its 
features. The CDSS was developed from an econometric model that used data from (de-
identified) electronic medical records for 3,202 surgery patients who had been discharged from a 
large southeastern hospital and subsequently readmitted or not readmitted with the same 
diagnosis code within 30 days. We used probit regression to estimate probabilities of 
readmission with data that included the average values of clinical variables during a patient’s 
stay, the duration of time spent outside and within the normal range of values expected for a 
particular clinical variable, counts of medications, images and transfusions, as well as a full set 
of interaction terms between the laboratory test and vital sign variables. We also used census 
track data that could be linked to the patient charts in a procedure that conformed with HIPAA 
privacy rules.8   
The electronic medical record and census track information were used to construct a data 
set that contained 48,889 unique patient-day observations that corresponded to the observed 
value of each patient’s data for each day during the hospital stay. This data set was used with the 
estimated probit model to construct the CDSS that reports probability of readmission for each 
individual patient in a representative sample if the patient were to be discharged from the 
hospital on that day. Time-varying point estimates of readmission probabilities and 80% 
confidence intervals were obtained from the probit-estimated parameter distributions and 
displayed by the CDSS (see Figures 1, 3 and 4 below for examples).  An 80% confidence 
interval was selected because it captures a 10% one-sided error on the decision criterion to 
discharge a patient on a given day. These daily readmission probabilities are used with targeted 
readmission rates that vary with patient diagnosis codes to determine the CDSS patient-specific 
daily discharge recommendations. The CDSS uses target readmission rates that are 10% 
reductions from historical readmission rates and are based on the targets stated by the Center for 
                                                          
 
8 Our procedures conform to the “Safe Harbor” Method as defined by the HIPAA Privacy Rule Section 
164.514 (B)(2). 
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Medicare and Medicaid Services in 2010. In addition to discharge recommendations and 
readmission probabilities, the CDSS dynamically displays six clinical variables that the probit 
model indicates are most significant for the discharge status of the individual patient on that day 
of the hospital stay. The clinical variables displayed in the six charts for a patient can change 
from one day to another day, reflecting the model’s updated implications with changing data on 
patient status (see Figures 1, 3 and 4 below for examples).  
 
4. Experimental Design and Protocol 
In order to conduct our experiment we selected 30 (de-identified) patient charts from the sample 
of 3,202 patient electronic medical records in our sample. The entire sample was first partitioned 
into low, medium and high readmission risk categories.9 We subsequently selected 10 patient 
charts from each of the three risk categories to provide a clear test of the efficacy of the software.   
The experimental design “crosses” the presence or absence of a 45 day constraint on the 
number of “experimental days” with alternative information and default conditions. Inclusion of 
the 45 day constraint increases the opportunity cost of keeping a patient longer in the hospital; 
this feature of the experiment is a stylized way of capturing the effect of a hospital’s “capacity” 
on discharge decision making. The alternative information and default conditions will be 
explained below. We first explain features of the experiment that are present in all treatment 
cells. 
4.a  Common Features of all Treatments 
The information provided to subjects in all treatment cells includes clinical variables that are the 
same as they would get from a hospital’s electronic medical records (EMR). Not only is the same 
information provided as in the hospital’s EMR, we also use a graphical interface that is a 
facsimile of the EMR computer display screens.  
                                                          
 
9 Target readmission rates that are 10% reductions from historically observed readmission rates for 
patients with different diagnosis codes were used for this partitioning.  A “low risk” patient had a 
procedure with a target readmission rate less than 10%, a “medium risk” patient was between 10% and 
17%, and “high risk” patient was greater than 17%. These are associated with the complexity of the 
surgery and the procedure-specific potential for infection and other complications; they are not patient-
specific. 
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A subject begins each experimental day by selecting patients from a list on a screen that 
displays summary information from each of three patient charts that includes patient age, sex, 
and length of stay in the hospital (up to the current experimental day) taken from electronic 
medical records. After selecting a patient, a subject in the experiment gets access to that patient’s 
chart information.  
A subject in the experiment did not always have to review a patient’s chart for the first 
few calendar days they were in the hospital if there was no realistic prospect for considering 
discharge during those days. The first “experiment day” on which a subject was asked to review 
a chart was randomly selected to be between one and four days before the discharge model 
would first recommend that the patient be discharged; this one to four day period was 
independently selected for each of the 30 patient charts. During an experimental session, the 30 
patient charts were presented in a random order that was independently drawn for each subject.  
In order to avoid leading the subjects towards making particular decisions, the dates of 
actual discharge of the patients were removed from the patient charts. Within the experiment it 
was, of course, possible that a patient could be retained longer than the observed length of stay in 
the EMR. Therefore, we constructed continuation charts for all 30 patients that imputed an extra 
five days of possible stay.10 In all treatments, the subjects were informed that they should assume 
that a patient was being managed at the appropriate standard of care while in the hospital and 
that the subjects were not being asked to speculate about additional tests or procedures that they 
might want to order. Instead, they were asked to make the hospital discharge decisions on the 
basis of the clinical information contained in the patient chart.  
At the beginning of an experiment session, the subjects were welcomed to the decision 
laboratory by one of the researchers who self-identified as a medical doctor and explained that 
the research was supported by an NIH grant.11  Each subject was informed that they would make 
a series of choices between the two options, “Discharge Patient” and “Do NOT Discharge 
Patient.” Any patient not discharged would return for consideration on the next experiment day 
with updated chart information. Any patient who was discharged could turn out to be 
successfully discharged or, alternatively, could be readmitted. The likelihood of readmission was 
                                                          
 
10 The percentages of patients discharged in the experiment that occurred during the continuation chart 
periods are 7.76, 8.77 and 7.48 in the baseline, information and default treatments.  
11 The subjects read and signed the IRB-approved consent form and subsequently began reading the 
subject instructions on their computer monitors. Subject instructions for the experiment can be found at 
http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/subjects.html.  
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based on the estimated probit model.12 Any patient readmitted in the experiment remained in the 
hospital for at least two experimental days during which the subject continued to view the 
updated chart.  
Subjects were informed that they could make at most a total of 30 choices of the 
Discharge Patient option. An unsuccessfully discharged patient “used up” one of these 30 
feasible choices. A subject was paid $5 for each successful discharge and nothing for 
unsuccessful discharges. Each experiment session could last no more than two hours. The two-
hour time limit, however, was not a binding constraint for any subject. In three treatment cells 
there was an additional constraint that the subject could not participate in more than 45 
experiment days.  In contrast, there was no limit on the number of experiment days that a subject 
could use to make up to 30 discharge decisions in the other three treatment cells. The purpose of 
the 45 experiment day constraint was to increase the opportunity cost of not discharging a 
patient. This 45 experiment day constraint was binding for some of the subjects in the three 
treatment cells in which it applied.  
4.b Idiosyncratic Features of the Baseline, Information, and Default Treatments  
In the Baseline Treatment, a subject makes the discharge decisions using only the information in 
the EMR. The default option in the Baseline Treatment is the same as in current medical 
practice: the patient remains in the hospital unless the physician with authority initiates entry of 
“discharge orders” in the EMR. The Information Treatment presents all of the EMR-facsimile 
screens used in the Baseline Treatment plus additional CDSS screens with selected patient 
information and a recommendation about the discharge decision. The default option in an 
Information Treatment is the same as in the Baseline Treatment. The Default Treatment presents 
all of the same information as in the Information Treatment, including a discharge 
recommendation, but uses a different default option. In the Default Treatment, the CDSS initiates 
                                                          
 
12 In the case that a patient was readmitted after being discharged in the experiment the subject was 
presented with a readmission chart for the patient. The readmission chart was based on the observed 
complications following discharge within the population of patients served by the hospital. Subjects were 
informed of the complication that required readmission and the patient chart data were altered to be 
consistent with the presence of the complication as reflected in the empirical evidence reported in Kassin, 
et al. (2012). Each patient’s chart was altered for only the first three to five days of their stay after 
readmission and the remaining chart days conformed to their observed data prior to being discharged.  
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discharge orders in EMR when it makes a positive discharge recommendation; an attending 
physician who did not accept the recommendation would have to enter reasons in the EMR for 
overriding the recommended decision. When the CDSS makes a negative recommendation, a 
physician would have to enter reasons for overriding the recommendation before entering 
discharge orders in EMR.13  
The subjects enter their decisions on screens that differ across the Baseline and Default 
Treatments. The decision screen for the Baseline Treatment includes only the patient’s ID, name, 
age, and sex and two buttons to be clicked in order to record a decision whether to discharge the 
patient on the experimental day recorded at the top of the screen. These buttons are labeled 
“Discharge Patient” and “Do NOT Discharge Patient.” If the subject clicks on the Do NOT 
Discharge Patient button, the patient remains “in the hospital” and reappears in the subject’s list 
of patients on the following experiment day. If the subject clicks on the Discharge Patient button, 
the patient is discharged. In the event of a successful discharge, the subject is paid five dollars. In 
the event of an unsuccessful discharge, the subject receives no payment and the patient is 
readmitted and reappears in the subject’s list of patients.  
There are three decision screens for the Default Treatment that will be described here 
(and three slightly different screens for the Information Treatment that will be described in 
footnotes). Which decision screen a subject encounters in the Default Treatment depends on the 
recommendation of the decision support software for the patient on that day. In case of a 
negative recommendation the decision maker encounters a decision screen like the one shown in 
Figure 1 that reports the recommendation “Do Not Discharge Patient” at the bottom left of the 
screen. The left side of the decision screen shows probabilities of readmission if the patient were 
to be discharged on any experiment day up to the present decision day (which is day 8, as shown 
on the horizontal axis). The dots at kinks in the piecewise linear graph show point estimates of 
the probabilities of readmission on days 1-8. The vertical dashed lines that pass through the dots 
(at kinks) correspond to the 80% confidence intervals of the readmission probability. The 
horizontal line shows the target readmission probability for patients with the diagnosis code of 
this patient. For the selected patient (Lucy Doe), the left part of the figure shows point estimates 
                                                          
 
13  Note that the change in default option would not alter the fact that the attending physician has authority 
and responsibility for discharging the patient.  This change in default option would change the procedure 
for entering discharge orders in the EMR.   
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that lie entirely above the horizontal line showing the target readmission rate; that is why the 
decision support software makes the negative recommendation. The six charts on the right two-
thirds of the screen show the days 1-8 values of clinical variables that are probabilistically most 
important for the discharge decision for this specific patient on the present experiment day 
(which is day 8, in this case). 
 
 
          Figure 1. Default Treatment Decision Screen with Negative Recommendation 
 
 The subject enters her decision by clicking on one of the two buttons at the lower right of 
the screen. If the subject accepts the recommendation she clicks on the Do NOT Discharge 
Patient button. If the subject does not accept the negative recommendation he clicks on the 
Overrule and Enter Reasons button.14  This choice causes the decision support software to open 
the screen shown in Figure 2 that requires the subject to enter her reasons for overruling the 
CDSS recommendation.15 The reasons for overruling the recommendation can be recorded by 
                                                          
 
14 The corresponding screen for the Information Treatment is identical to the one in Figure 1 except that 
the two buttons are labeled Discharge Patient and Do NOT Discharge Patient.  
15 In the Information Treatment there is no screen corresponding to the one in Figure 2.   
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clicking on (square) radial buttons on the left side of the screen and entering text on the right side 
of the screen.    
 
 
           Figure 2.  Reasons to Overrule a Negative Recommendation  
 
Figure 3 shows data for a day on which the decision support software does not make a 
recommendation whether to discharge or not to discharge Lucy Doe; instead, it exhibits the 
“recommendation” for day 9 as Physician Judgment. A Physician Judgment “recommendation” 
occurs when the target readmission rate falls between the point estimate and the upper bound on 
the 80% confidence interval for the readmission probability. Although there is no recommended 
decision in this case, the software does provide decision support with the information in the 
readmission probabilities on the left side of the screen and the six dynamically-selected clinical 
variables on the right side of the screen.16  The subject enters a decision on this screen by 
clicking on one of the two buttons in the bottom right corner of the screen shown in Figure 3.17   
                                                          
 
16 The clinical variables exhibited in Figure 1 and Figure 3 are not all the same variables, which reflects 
the dynamic updating of the decision support model as patient variables change from one day to another 
in the electronic medical record for this patient. 
17 The corresponding screen for the Information Treatment is identical to the one in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Default Treatment Decision Screen with Physician Judgment “Recommendation” 
The CDSS first recommends that Lucy Doe be discharged on the experiment day in 
which the top of the 80% error bar dips below the target readmission rate. This conservative 
criterion reflects choice of an estimated 10% error for the positive recommendation. In the 
example shown in Figure 4, the first day on which the top of the error bar drops below the target 
readmission rate is experiment day 11. The software’s recommendation on that day is Discharge 
Patient. The subject enters her decision by clicking on one of the two buttons at the lower right 
of the screen.18 If the subject accepts the recommendation she clicks on the Discharge Patient 
button. If the subject does not accept the negative recommendation she clicks on the Overrule 
and Enter Reasons button. This choice opens the screen shown in Figure 5 that requires the 
subject to enter his reasons for overruling the software’s positive recommendation.19  
                                                          
 
18 The corresponding screen for the Information Treatment is identical to the one in Figure 4 except that 
the two buttons are labeled Discharge Patient and Do NOT Discharge Patient. 
19 In the Information Treatment there is no screen corresponding to the one in Figure 5.   
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          Figure 4. Default Treatment Decision Screen with Positive Recommendation 
 
 
 
                      Figure 5.  Reasons to Overrule a Positive Recommendation 
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5. Results from the Experiment 
A total of one hundred and twenty-five subjects participated in the experiments; twenty of these 
subjects were resident physicians and the rest were fourth-year medical students. Subjects were 
distributed almost equally across the Baseline (43 subjects), Information (42 subjects), and 
Default (40 subjects) treatments. The overall number (64) of female participants was similar to 
the number (61) of male subjects, as was the gender composition across treatments ((21F, 22M), 
(20F, 22M) and (23F, 17M); Pearson chi2(2)=0.95, p-value=0.62). Academic performance of 
subjects who participated in different treatments was at comparable levels.20  
After making their discharge decisions, subjects completed an online questionnaire that 
was embedded in the experiment software. The questionnaire elicited demographic information 
and also included hypothetical response questions about risk attitudes.21 After completing the 
questionnaire, subjects exited the lab one at a time to be paid in cash in private. Average subject 
payoff was $131 for participation lasting, on average, 90 minutes.   
We ran two designs that differ from each other only with respect to whether there was a 
constraint (of 45 days) on the number of experimental days. Fifty-four subjects (out of 125) 
participated in the design with the 45 experimental days constraint and 71 participated in the 
design with no constraint on the number of experimental days.  
Data from our experiment provide support for efficacy of the decision support software 
with respect to four measures of performance: subject earnings, quality of service (readmission 
rate), hospital length of stay, and time efficiency (number of experimental days utilized to make 
a certain number of discharges). We report several ways of describing the data and statistical 
analysis for significance of treatment effects.  
5.a Decision Time Efficiency and Daily Experiment Earnings 
In the treatment cells without the 45 day constraint, subjects took on average 54 experimental 
days to finish the experiment (i.e. to make 30 discharges) in the Baseline Treatment but in the 
Information and Default Treatments they were able to complete the task of making 30 discharges 
                                                          
 
20 Reported average grades in medical school of subjects in the Baseline, Information and Default 
Treatments were 3.59, 3.57 and 3.46 (Kruskal-Wallis test: chi2 = 3.32, p-value=0.19).  
21 The questionnaire can be found at http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/subjects.html. 
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within 47 and 42 experimental days, respectively, an improvement in time efficiency of 7 and 12 
experimental days. The null hypothesis of equal time efficiency across treatments is rejected 
(chi2=6.42; p-value=0.04 according to Kruskal-Wallis test).22  Data from treatments in which the 
discharge decision support software is used are significantly more efficient than the Baseline but 
the effect is stronger in the Default Treatment (one sided p-values reported by the t-test are 0.043 
or 0.004, respectively, when the Baseline is compared with the Information or Default 
Treatment).   Figure 6 shows cumulative distributions of experimental days in the Baseline and 
Default Treatments.  
 
Figure 6. Cumulative Distributions of Observed Experimental Days  
Average subject earnings per experimental day were $2.83, $3.15 and $3.62 in the 
Baseline, Information and Default Treatments, as reported in the top panel of Table 1 (with 
standard deviations in braces).23 Subjects’ daily earnings are highest in the Default Treatment 
                                                          
 
22 Since in the 45-day-constraint design subjects couldn’t go above 45 days we are excluding these data in 
the analysis of time efficiency in the main text because of potential bias. If we include those data, the task 
of 30 discharges takes 49, 44, and 40 experimental days, respectively, for the baseline, information, and 
default treatments. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis of equal distributions of 
experimental days across treatments is rejected (chi2 = 8.32, p-value = 0.016).  
23 These “experimental day” payoff amounts are average amounts paid for the time taken to review three 
patient charts and consider making a discharge decision for each of the patients (during an “experimental 
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and lowest in the Baseline Treatment. We ran one-way analysis of variance by ranks (Kruskal-
Wallis tests) to ascertain whether daily earnings across different treatments come from the same 
distribution. The null hypothesis (of the same earnings) is rejected by this test (chi-squared 
statistic is 12.33, two-sided p-value is 0.002).  
Next, we ask which treatments are responsible for this rejection. The means of the ranks 
of daily earnings of three treatments are shown in the lower panel of Table 1. The p-values for 
each pairwise comparison are shown in the bottom two rows. Using (Bonferroni) adjusted p-
values for multiple comparisons, we conclude that baseline and default data on earnings per day 
are coming from different distributions; subjects in the Default Treatment are earning more per 
experimental day than subjects in the Baseline Treatment.  
 
Table 1. Comparisons of Daily Earnings across Treatments 
 Baseline Information Default 
Number of Subjects 43 42 40 
Mean 
{st.dev.} 
$2.83 
{0.94} 
$3.15 
{0.94} 
$3.62 
{1.16} 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
RankMean 49.22 63.64 77.14 
Information 0.033 --  
Default 0.0002*** 0.046 -- 
(Rank Means and p-values correspond to Kruskal-Wallis test; the adjusted p-value for multiple 
comparisons is 0.008 in case of all pairwise comparisons and 0.0125 in case the baseline is treated as a 
control group, i.e. comparing the baseline to the other two.) 
 
We are also interested in other features of the experimental design and individuals’ 
characteristics that are correlated with higher daily earnings. So we ran linear regressions (with 
robust standard errors) of daily earnings as a dependent variable and Information and Default 
Treatment dummies, a dummy for the 45-day constraint, and subject demographic variables as 
right-hand variables. The parameter estimates are as follows (standard errors in braces):24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
day”). They are not the average amount paid to subjects for participation in an experiment session which, 
as reported above, was $131.   
24 F(10,108)=2.94 (p-value=0.003), 119 observations. Six observations were dropped during the 
regression because of incomplete demographics responses. The estimates of the robust regression without 
demographics for the information and default treatments are 0.31 (p-value = 0.10) and 0.65 (p-value = 
0.001) and F(4,120)= 4.08 (p-value=0.004). 
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** **
45
{1.424} {0.164} {0.231} {0.366} {0.142}
***
{0.152} {0.172} {0.153} {0.043}
 3.63 0.28 0.46 0.15 0.15
0.09 0.06 0.47 0.02 0.72
day resident undergrad med
music athlete female
Daily Earnings D D GPA GPA
D D D risk   
*** *
inf
{0.186} {0.180}
0.31default oD D
 
Daily earnings are lower for residents (by 46 cents) and female physicians (by 47 cents); they 
are also lower (by 28 cents) in the treatment with the 45-day constraint on the maximum number 
of experimental days. There are insignificant effects of musical training and record of 
competitive athletics (although such characteristics are selected for in admissions to the surgical 
specialty). With respect to treatment effects, consistent with findings at the aggregate level of 
data analysis, daily earnings of subjects in the Default and Information Treatments are 20% and 
9% higher than in the Baseline (p-values are 0.000 and 0.087).25  Subjects are also making more 
money per experimental day in the Default Treatment than in the Information Treatment.26  We 
conclude that:  
Result 1. Use of the CDSS, with or without making the CDSS’s recommendation the default 
option, increases: (a) decision time efficiency; and (b) daily earnings. 
One may wonder whether the increased decision time efficiency that we observe in the 
treatments has a negative effect on the quality of care. Given the design of our experiment, lower 
quality would be manifested in higher readmissions. Readmission rate is one of the factors that 
affect the ranking of a hospital and it is also one that has attracted increasing attention from 
Medicare, including fines for excess readmissions beginning in October 2012. In the following 
section we look closely at the interaction between different treatments and readmission rates in 
our experiment.  
 
5.b Readmissions as an indicator of the quality of care 
An earlier discharge is not an indicator of better discharge decision making if it decreases the 
quality of care. An indicator of the quality of care is the readmission rate since a premature 
discharge increases the likelihood of an unplanned but necessary readmission. Averages of 
                                                          
 
25 Note that 0.72/3.63   0.20 and 0.31/3.63   0.09 using the coefficient estimates.  
26 Estimates for the information and default treatments are different from each other ( F(1,108)=4.80, p-
value=0.031.) 
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readmission rates of all regular patients27 observed across treatments are 10.21%, 10.40% and 
9.84%, respectively, for the Baseline, Information and Default Treatments. For regular patients 
with high levels of targeted readmission probabilities (at least 17%) the mean readmission rates 
are 13.49%, 12.70% and 10.80% for the Baseline, Information and Default Treatments.28  Means 
tests imply that use of the CDSS combined with change in the default option significantly 
reduces the overall mean of readmissions by 3.6% and the rate for high risk patients by 20%. In 
contrast, the means test implies no significant difference between the Baseline and Information 
Treatments.   
We ran probit regressions with binary dependent variable that takes value 1 if a regular 
patient is readmitted. Covariates include subjects’ demographics, a risk aversion index,29 
patients’ targeted readmission probabilities, whether the patient was discharged before the first 
recommended discharge day (Understay = 1) or after that day (Overstay = 1), and the 
recommended length of stay until first discharge recommendation (Rec. LOS). Table 2 reports 
the estimated coefficients (and p-values of the probit regressions) with clusters at the subject 
level using data for the high risk patients (columns (1) and (2)) and all patients (columns (3) and 
(4)). The probit regressions reported in columns (2) and (4) include the Rec. LOS variable, 
reported in the first row of the table, while regressions reported in the other columns exclude it. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
27 A patient is called “regular” if he has not previously been readmitted. 
28 One third of “patients” in our experiments had a targeted probability of readmission higher than 0.17; 
we call such patients “high risk” patients.  
29 In the hypothetical ten ordered tasks in the post-experiment survey, a risk neutral subject switches from 
the safer option to the riskier option in task 5. The risk index variable that we constructed is the difference 
between the number of the task that a subject switches (for the first time) from choosing the safer option 
to choosing the riskier one and task five. Hence, the risk index is negative for a risk lover and positive for 
a risk averse subject (the later the switch the lower the subject’s tolerance to risk). 
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Table 2. Probit Regressions of Readmissions for Regular Patients  
 
VARIABLES 
 
High Risk Patients 
 
All Patients 
 
Rec. LOS … 0.005 … -0.009*** 
 … (0.185) … (0.000) 
Understay 0.004 0.000 0.016*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.617) (0.976) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overstay -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.498) (0.660) (0.311) (0.252) 
Information -0.020 -0.019 -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.386) (0.397) (0.972) (0.958) 
Default -0.047** -0.045** -0.015 -0.015 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.211) (0.190) 
Female -0.013 -0.015 -0.006 -0.004 
 
(0.492) (0.439) (0.570) (0.723) 
Athlete 0.019 0.019 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.384) (0.396) (0.592) (0.563) 
Musical -0.034* -0.035* -0.023** -0.021** 
 
(0.075) (0.066) (0.027) (0.040) 
Medical GPA 0.013 0.013 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.297) (0.314) (0.537) (0.508) 
Undergrad GPA 0.003 0.004 -0.017 -0.021 
 
(0.949) (0.929) (0.511) (0.431) 
Risk Avers. Index -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.200) (0.262) 
Resident -0.013 -0.016 0.010 0.014 
 
(0.629) (0.563) (0.597) (0.446) 
Target Probability 4.207*** 4.480*** 0.762*** 0.954*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
45 Day Constraint 0.051** 0.050** 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) 
Nobs 1,063 3,197 
 
 Results reported in Table 2 show treatment effects that are consistent with the aggregated 
data figures reported above; the Default Treatment induces a significant reduction in the 
readmissions of high risk patients. Probabilities of readmissions in the Default (holding all other 
covariates at the means) are 4.5% to 4.7% lower than in the Baseline for the high risk patients.30  
We conclude that:  
                                                          
 
30 Probabilities of readmissions of regular patients in the information and default treatments (holding all 
other covariates at the means) are 1.7% and 0.57% lower than in the baseline, but these figures are not 
statistically different from 0. 
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Result 2. Use of the CDSS and making the CDSS’s recommendation the default option 
reduces readmissions of high risk patients.  
Referring to the estimates of Understay and Overstay in Table 2, we find that for data from 
all patients (right two columns) the patient Understay variable has a positive effect on 
readmission while the estimate of the Overstay variable is insignificant. This gives us the third 
result: 
Result 3. Discharging a patient earlier than recommended by the CDSS significantly 
increases the likelihood of unplanned readmission while later-than-recommended discharge 
does not significantly decrease it. 
Readmissions are significantly higher in the design with a constraint (of 45 days) on the 
maximum number of experimental days. Subjects with musical training have lower readmissions 
for all patients and high risk patients while those with a higher risk aversion index have lower 
readmissions with high risk patients. The recommended hospital length of stay (Rec. LOS) also 
has a significantly negative effect on readmissions31 but the effect disappears when only the high 
risk patients are considered. We next turn our attention to hospital length of stay (LOS) across 
treatments.  
5.c Hospital Length of Stay 
The average figures for observed LOS of regular patients are 7.72, 7.15 and 6.64 for the 
Baseline, Information and Default Treatments.32 The OLS estimates (and robust standard errors 
in braces) of the hospital length of stay for regular patients are33  
 
        
        
** ***
45
{2.053} {0.248} {0.301} {0.548} {0.126}
*** ***
{0.220} {0.285} {0.217} {0.072} {0.305}
LOS 7.75 0.32 0.84 0.29 0.13
0.40 0.08 0.71 0.06 0.92
day resident undergrad med
music athlete female
D D GPA GPA
D D D risk   
* *
inf
{0.275}
0.50default oD D
 
                                                          
 
31 The estimated marginal effect is - 0.01 (std. error is 0.002) for the model reported in the right-most 
column of Table 2. 
32 If we include days in the hospital after a patient is readmitted in LOS then we get the following average 
hospital lengths of stay for the baseline, information and default treatments: 8.60, 8.11 and 7.42. 
33 F(10,118)=6.35 (p-value=0.00), nobs=3274, 119 clusters. If we include in LOS days in the hospital as a 
readmitted patient we still get similar results; the estimates for the information and the default treatments 
are -0.48 and -1.05. 
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Female subjects and resident physicians kept their patients in the hospital longer but their 
readmissions were not lower than others (as shown in Table 2). The hospital length of stay of 
regular patients is lower in both the Information (by a half day) and Default (by almost one day) 
treatments while there are no higher readmission rates in these treatments (see Table 2 estimates 
for the Information and Default dummy variable parameters). We conclude that:  
Result 4. Use of the CDSS, with or without making the CDSS’s recommendation the default 
option, reduces hospital length of stay without increasing readmissions.  
 
 5.d Value of Decision Support Information 
After completing all discharge decisions, subjects who participated in the Default and 
Information Treatments were asked (by the experiment software) to report their ranking on a 
five-point Likert scale (where higher is better) of the usefulness of being provided information 
on the estimated readmission probabilities and the 80% confidence intervals. Half of the subjects 
reported a score 3 or higher for both the point estimate and the 80% confidence interval.  
The difference between daily earnings of the subjects who gave a score of three or higher 
for the usefulness of the point estimate (call it group H) and the average daily earnings of those 
who reported a lower score than three (call it group L) can be used as an economic measure of 
the effects of subjects’ acceptance of the value of the readmission probability information. The 
mean daily earnings are $3.15 and $3.53 for groups L and H; the median figures are $2.87 and 
$3.42 for groups L and H. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects at 1% significance level (p-
value is 0.001) the null hypothesis of daily earnings of the two groups being drawn from the 
same distribution. Similarly, the difference between days a patient is kept in the hospital by 
subjects of groups L and H can be used as an indicator of acceptance of the value of the 
information. The means are 3.43 and 2.82 days for groups L and H. Hence, in our experiment, a 
result from subjects’ recognizing the value of the information is a reduction of length of stay of 
0.61 days per patient, a decrease of 18%. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects at 1% 
significance level (p-value is 0.000) the null hypothesis that the distributions of observed length 
of stay (from the first day the patient is seen by subjects) are the same for the L and H groups of 
subjects. We conclude that: 
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 Result 5. Subjects who report they place relatively high value on usefulness of reported 
readmission probabilities: (a) keep their patients significantly fewer days in the hospital; and (b) 
earn significantly higher payoffs per experimental day. 
We also looked at the economic significance of following a recommendation. If we 
exclude rounds when the software reports Physician Judgment, we find that the (average) 
compliance rates are 80.78% and 81.44% in the Information and Default Treatments. In those 
treatments, subjects who discharged a patient when the recommendation was not to discharge 
earned $4.06 for serving that patient whereas those subjects who discharged a patient when the 
recommendation was to discharge earned $4.75, an increase of 17%.  Tobit estimates of the 
determinant of earnings are34  
** *** ******
45
{23.73} {11.26} {2.71} {4.00} {6.01}
{1.98} {2.44} {2.73} {2.62}
49.57 30.70 18.17 1 .01 18.59
0.469 3.04 3.56 3.91 0.
day resident undergrad
med music athlete female
Earnings complyRate D D GPA
GPA D D D
        
        
{0.68} {0.20}
49 3.31 defaultrisk D  
 
where the “complyRate” variable is the rate of compliance, defined as the number of times that a 
subject’s decisions were the same as the decision recommended by the CDSS divided by the 
total number of the subject’s decisions.35  The coefficient estimate for the complyRate variable is 
positive and significantly different from 0 (p-value is 0.008). We conclude that: 
  
 Result 6.  Subjects who comply with the CDSS's recommendations have significantly higher 
earnings. 
 
Together, Results 5 and 6 inform us that subjects obtain higher earnings in the 
experiment when they: (a) report that they place relatively high value on usefulness of the CDSS 
readmission probability estimates; or (b) comply with the CDSS’s recommendations to discharge 
or not to discharge patients. These conclusions are stronger for the Default Treatment.  
                                                          
 
34 Log-likelihood is -282, LR chi2(10) is 58.04, number of observations is 79. There are five right- 
censored observations for subjects who earned the maximum amount of money, $150. Three observations 
were dropped because of incomplete demographic responses. Tobit estimate of the complyRate variable 
when demographics are not included (all 82 observations included) is 35.18 (p-value=0.002).  
35 In the construction of the variable complyRate, subjects’ decisions when the recommendation is 
Physician Judgment are not included. 
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These results suggest another question concerning the reasons why the CDSS leads to 
better discharge decisions in the experiment. Does this occur because a high proportion of 
subjects are reluctant to overrule CDSS recommendations, most especially when they have to 
enter reasons for doing so?  Some insight into this question is provided by analyzing only that 
subset of the data in which the CDSS provides probability information and six dynamically 
selected patient charts but does not provide a recommendation to discharge or not to discharge 
the patient; these are the experimental days in patient charts in which the CDSS’s 
“recommendation” is Physician Judgment. We compare the performance measures of decisions 
in the Baseline and Default Treatments using only the data from experimental days in which the 
“recommendation” is Physician Judgment and find that: mean total payoff is higher in the 
Default Treatment; mean experimental days is lower in the Default Treatment; and mean 
readmission rate for high risk patients is lower in the Default Treatment. Furthermore, payoff per 
experimental day is significantly higher in the Default Treatment and the total number of 
experimental days is significantly lower in the Default Treatment. In this way we find that the 
information provided by the CDSS improves discharge decision making even in the absence of a 
definitive recommendation about discharge, at least in the context of the Default Treatment. This 
suggests that the Default Treatment may better focus decision makers’ attention on the new 
information (shown in the decision screen charts) provided by the CDSS even when it does not 
report a recommended decision. 
 
5.e Effects of Capacity Constraint 
The probit regressions in Table 2 show higher readmission rates in the presence of the 45-day 
constraint. The OLS regression shows, however, that LOS of regular patients is not affected by 
the 45-day constraint. But these figures are confounded with differences in numbers of patients 
discharged between the no-constraint and 45-day constraint treatments. We seek to isolate the 
effects on readmissions per patient discharged. For each subject we constructed a new variable, 
ReadmissionRate, which is the number of patients readmitted divided by the total number of 
discharges. Figure 7 shows kernel densities of this variable for both designs, with and without 
the 45-day constraint. It can be easily seen that the readmission rates are higher for subjects who 
were making discharge decisions under the 45-day constraint. The mean readmission rates are 
7.5% and 11.9%, respectively, in the no-constraint and 45-day constraint treatments; the 
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differences are statistically significant at 1% (p-value reported by t-test is 0.0001; nobs are 51 
and 54).36  
 
             Figure 7. Kernel Densities for Readmissions/Discharges 
5.f Reduction in Length of Stay 
According to their electronic medical records, the 30 patients whose de-identified charts are used 
in our experiment were kept in the hospital an average of 9.37 days.  In our Baseline Treatment, 
the average length of stay (LOS) was 8.6 days.  This reduction may have resulted from the 
exclusive focus on the discharge decision created by the experimental environment.  The average 
LOS in the Default Treatment was 7.42 days, which is 14% lower than the Baseline number of 
8.6 days.  This reduction in LOS did not produce higher readmission rates since the rates for the 
Baseline and Default Treatments were, respectively, 10.2% and 9.8% . 
 
 
                                                          
 
36 If we include residents (who participated only in the no-constraints design), we still find that the mean 
readmission rates are 7.8% and 11.9% respectively in the no-constraint and 45-day constraint treatments. 
The t-test rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis of higher readmissions in the 
presence of the 45-day constraint at 1% (p-value is .0001). Numbers of observations are 71 and 54 in the 
no-constraint and 45-day constraint treatments. 
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6.  Summary and Concluding Remarks  
The hospital discharge decision plays a central role in the increasingly important interplay 
between the quality of healthcare delivery and medical costs. Premature discharge can lead to 
unplanned readmission with higher costs and questionable quality of care. Needlessly delayed 
discharge wastes increasingly expensive healthcare resources.  
Our research program has analyzed patient data to identify risk factors for unplanned 
hospital readmissions (Kassin, et al. 2012), elicited physicians’ stated criteria for discharge 
decisions (Leeds, et al 2013), estimated predictors of physicians’ actual discharge decisions 
(Leeds, et al. 2014), and estimated clinical and demographic patient variables that predict 
successful vs. unsuccessful discharges (Leeds, et al. 2014).  Inconsistencies between stated 
criteria, statistically-explanatory actual criteria, and predictors of successful discharge suggest 
that discharge decision making might be improved by application of large-sample, evidenced-
based discharge criteria at the point of care where the discharge decision is made. Our approach 
to providing a tool for improving discharge decision making is to develop and test a Clinical 
Decision Support System (CDSS) for hospital discharges.   
Cox, et al. (2014) reports development of the CDSS and a preliminary laboratory 
experiment on its efficacy. The present paper reports a laboratory experiment with efficacy of the 
CDSS in a treatment that makes the recommendation of the CDSS the default option.  We also 
report results from a treatment that places time pressure on decision makers and analyze data 
from all laboratory experiments with the CDSS to date.   
Taken together, our laboratory experiments produce data for treatment cells in a 2 by 3 
design that crosses presence or absence of a 45 experimental day constraint with Baseline, 
Information, and Default Treatments. The Baseline Treatment presents subjects only with the 
kind of information that they receive from currently-used electronic medical records (EMR); 
indeed, the subject screens used in the Baseline Treatment are facsimiles of EMR screens. The 
Information Treatment uses these same EMR-facsimile screens plus a new screen that reports 
information provided by the decision support model. The information screen shows point 
estimates of marginal readmission probabilities and their 80 percent error bounds for 
experimental days prior to and including the relevant experimental decision day. The information 
screen displays six charts of dynamically-selected clinical variables that the probit regression 
model indicates have the highest marginal effects for predicting outcomes from discharge of that 
patient on that day during their hospital stay. Finally, the information screen shows one of three 
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recommendations (discharge, physician judgment, or do not discharge) that are based on the 
relationship between Medicare’s target readmission probability for patients with the relevant 
diagnosis code and the readmission probability point estimate and 80 percent confidence interval 
for the patient whose data are under consideration. The Default Treatment differs from the 
Information Treatment by changing the default option for patient discharge. In the Information 
Treatment, the default option is that the patient remains in the hospital unless the responsible 
decision maker initiates an affirmative discharge order. In contrast, in the Default Treatment the 
patient is discharged or not discharged according to the recommendation of the decision support 
software unless the decision maker overrides that recommendation and provides reasons for 
rejecting it. 
Data from our experiment provide support for efficacy of the CDSS with respect to the 
two central performance measures for hospital discharge decision making, lower readmission 
rate and shorter length of stay. The data also provide support for effectiveness of the CDSS in 
promoting time efficiency in making discharge decisions and for the traditional experimental 
economics performance measure of subject earnings in the experiment. The CDSS is more 
effective in the Default Treatment than in the Information Treatment; in other words, combining 
the information provided by the CDSS with making the software’s recommendation the default 
option is more effective in promoting better discharge decisions than simply providing the 
information. Superior outcomes with the Default Treatment occur even for the subset of 
experimental days in which the CDSS does not offer a recommended decision; hence it is not 
solely subjects’ conformance to recommendations that accounts for the treatment effect. Subjects 
perform generally better in the absence than presence of a (“45 experimental day”) constraint 
that puts them under time pressure. Subjects who report they place relatively high value on 
information provided by the CDSS make better discharge decisions.  
 Further research collaboration is in progress. The next stage of research on the hospital 
discharge decision involves patient ward intervention. This requires development of a version of 
the CDSS that can interact with electronic medical records systems in real time and development 
of the protocol for the intervention.   
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